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This paper draws upon the work of the syncretic Chinese Marxist Li Dazhao to elaborate an 
idea of “global thought” which is more than just a localized form of Western knowledge.  
Li’s work offers both an example, and also a theory, of global thought: his work emerges 
from the intersection of multiple trajectories of thought with diverse origins, and in the 
process offers a theory of agency to explain how action in the present renders those 
trajectories intelligible as lineages which can inspire future innovations.  I argue that this 
opens the possibility for a global thought defined by a plurality of lineages, whose 
continuities stretch into the history and future of Asia as well as of Europe. I suggest two 
such lineages for Li’s work here: one links Li’s work to contemporary Chinese responses; the 
other to scholarship in political and social theory which emphasizes the vitalist role of time in 
the exercise of agency.  These comparisons demonstrate the extent to which global thought 
such as Li’s transforms where (and when) thinking in the present and future might ground its 
arguments, and from which historical materials it might draw its resources.  
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This paper conceptualizes and defends a distinctive form of global thought by 
examining the work of Li Dazhao (1888-1927), well-known as “China’s first Marxist” but 
whose diverse contributions to historiography and social theory are relatively overlooked.  
This global thought is distinctive in that it does not merely take the global as an object of 
reference or concern, as do many theories of cosmopolitanism or globalization. Rather, it 
considers the methods by which thought itself builds upon ideas and processes which are 
global in lineage, and the implications for its substantive claims when it does so.  Li’s work is 
relevant here precisely because it both enables and exemplifies this mode of global thought.  
He enables this mode through offering a theory of time as an ontological, non-human force 
that shapes, but also makes possible, human efforts to change their political and social worlds.  
This theory of time, as I will argue below, authorizes a particular form of agency to combine 
and redirect otherwise dispersed lineages of thought toward new futures.  Here, Li 
exemplifies this mode of global thought by drawing on a wide range of traditions to think 
about how action in the present transforms both our shared future trajectories as well as our 
past lineages.  Using Li’s own theory of agency, we can see that Li does not simply inflect 
putatively universal traditions with local particularity—that is, he cannot be said to simply 
“sinicize Marxism,” or even to “provincialize Europe,” 1 precisely because his theory shows 
that such lineages do not track some past heritage with given content.  It is the lineages 
themselves which become ordered and intelligible—and indeed potentially more 
“universal”—through his interventions.  
This paper thus works with and from, but also on, Li’s ideas: “global thought” is my 
conceptualization of how Li’s work might be understood through his own theory of agency, 
as well as how it might be generalized to theorize new relationships between time, agency, 
and the material and conceptual connectivities associated with globalized life.  Acting in and 
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 Maurice J Meisner, Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
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through time as Li suggests, I situate Li’s own thought as global: I do this not only by 
exploring the character of his global influences, but also and more importantly by showing 
how his work orients two different and typically unrelated trajectories of thought.  His vitalist, 
material understanding of time draws him close to contemporary and current scholarship 
influenced by Marxism and Darwinism, even as his insistence on the efficacy of self-
cultivation evokes neo-Confucian commitments to world-ordering.  However, and again 
following Li’s own recommendations,  I suggest that these trajectories do not determine Li’s 
thought, so much as our reading of Li’s thought determines how we view such trajectories.  
This reading clarifies some interpretive problems that have plagued scholarship on Li Dazhao 
and his Chinese contemporaries, which like much thought from colonial or semi-colonial 
societies tends to be imperfectly understood when read as a repository of poorly digested 
Western ideas. More importantly, however, it shows that global thought such as Li’s comes 
into being at the intersection of multiple trajectories of thought circulating in diverse spaces, 
even as it acts to render those trajectories intelligible as lineages of present thought and action. 
In other words, Li’s thought transforms not only the future production of knowledge, but also 
how we identify and organize those resources from the past which are seen to inform it. In 
my conclusion, I consider how this re-orientation enhances the capacity of globally diffuse 
yet typically marginalized (“non-Western”) thought to shape present and future knowledge-
production.  Establishing or maintaining continuities with this thought resists the historical 
ruptures which confine it to the spaces of the “traditional” or even “historical,” and so 
validates its relevance to our knowledge in the present and future.   
 
Time and Agency 
Li Dazhao and his contemporaries faced a world of constant change.  The revolution 
of 1911 ended the nearly three-hundred-year-old Qing dynasty, establishing republican 
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government for the first time in China’s history.  The instability which accompanied the new 
regime, marked by the threat of Euro-American imperialism as well as domestic 
fragmentation and economic collapse, intensified ongoing efforts by intellectuals to make 
sense of China’s future within a global order now centered outside its borders.2  By the end of 
the Qing, growing recognition of China as just one part of a broader world encouraged many 
reformers to frame China as a stage or site of da tong, an immanent “great commonality” 
constituted by the interdependent causation of all things in the cosmos.
3
  Intellectuals were 
particularly drawn to Western scholarship which offered explanations for China’s past 
failures and schemes for improving its future in terms of its place within a global milieu, such 
as social Darwinism, evolutionary theory, and, increasingly, critiques of capitalist industrial 
development.   
Li Dazhao was the most theoretically sophisticated of those who articulated the ways 
in which human actions might respond to and embody such cosmic interdependency, 
extending the da tong concepts of an earlier generation to consider how agents might act 
within, while transforming, the geopolitical reality they confronted.  His academic and 
popular work over a period of more than a decade specified this problem as how time bridges 
human action and history.  His early essays, written before his encounter with Marxism in the 
late 1910s, encourage young people to orient themselves to the open-ended future through 
cultivating their youthful, “springtime” sensibilities. Their imagery of seasonal renewal and 
self-cultivation reflects Li’s education in Confucian texts and lifelong interest in Daoism; 
their call to politically transform the future encourages acceptance of the European and 
American ideas that since the 1840s had been transmitted to China through Japan. Time 
                                                          
2
 Luke S. K. Kwong, “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-
1911,” Past & Present no. 173 (November 1, 2001): 157–190; Xiaobing Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist 
Discourse of Modernity :the Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 
1996). 
3
 Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920,” 
in An Intellectual History of Modern China, ed. Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 16. 
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reappears again as Li interprets the concepts of Marxist historical materialism for Chinese 
audiences. His ruminations culminate in his 1924 masterwork Shi xue yao lun (Essentials of 
Historical Study), written while serving as a history professor at Beijing University. 
Li conceptualizes time as an ontological condition of existence that encapsulates the 
“now” within a dynamic and unevenly emergent past and future. The agency that he sees as 
enabled by time involves coming to terms with the ontological capacities of time to both 
discipline and enable human action in the present.  These capacities inaugurate a new world 
which effectively reorients future possibilities for action, as well as transforms history, by 
refiguring our relation to the past.  For Li, agency—the capacity to act efficaciously within 
environments shared by other human and non-human forces—was underwritten by the power 
to transform whole epochs of shared history through the narration of selective pasts, the 
mobilization of present energies, and the propulsion of human will through open-ended, 
evolutionary time.   In this sense, Li’s agency enacts what recent political theorists have 
called an “event,” “which dislodge[s] the anticipations and expectations that we have in 
regard to the future.” 4   
Importantly, however, Li insists that agency does not constitute a rupture in what has 
gone before; actors must abide by the continuity presented by the ceaseless flow of time, 
when the “now” perpetually presents itself as a moment of action.  In a 1918 essay titled 
“Now” (jin, lit., “currentness,” or “presentness”) Li situates human actions within a stretch of 
historical time that carries with it an ever-growing accumulation of ideas from the past, even 
as that same movement of time also makes possible infinite transformations in the future—
and, indeed, also of the past:   
 
                                                          
4
 Michelle Bastian, “Inventing Nature: Re-writing Time and Agency in a More-than-Human World,” Australian 
Humanities Review 47 (2009): 110. 
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The actions from an age do not disappear, but still remain within the next age; and in 
this way being transmitted infinitely, [those actions] are imbued with a linking to the 
infiniteness of the world…. Limitless ‘pasts’ all take ‘now’ as their point of refuge; 
and limitless ‘futures’ all take ‘now’ as their source.5  
 
Li goes on to explain that it is the ‘now’ that completes the linkage between past and future, 
comprising the “great reality” (da shizai) that is eternity, marked by its lack of either 
beginning or end.6 Therefore, the past is not “dead,” because time and its history is “the 
process of human life, the continuation of human life, the transformations of human life, the 
transmissions of human life; it is a thing with a life, a living thing, a progressive thing, a 
developing thing, a circulating and changing thing.”7 
Influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, but also by the philosophy of  
cosmological transience articulated in the ancient Chinese divination text the Yijing (Book of 
Changes), Li portrays time as a living force which enjoys its own self-propelled dynamism. 
Time is “an open-ended becoming,” to use the description Elizabeth Grosz offers for the 
evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin.8  Human agents who desire the power to act 
efficaciously in such a world must therefore consider not only the actions and concerns of 
other humans, but also the vitalist force that is time.  By placing ourselves within the 
unceasing “torrent” of reality that time presents to us, we must learn to shape our goals and 
expectations in ways that can be served by and blend with time: 
 
                                                          
5
 Dazhao Li, “Jin (Now),” Xin Qingnian 4, no. 4 (April 15, 1918): 533; All page number citations from Li are 
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6
 Li, “Jin,” 533. 
7
 Dazhao Li, Shi Xue Yao Lun (Essentials of Historical Study), Bai Ke Xiao Congshu 51 (Shanghai: Commercial 
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8
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We can say that the torrent of “great reality” perpetually races from a beginningless 
reality to an endless reality.  Our self, our life, also perpetually blends with all the 
trends of life, following the current of great reality, so as to create breadth, continuity 
(duan xu), evolutionary transformation (jin zhuan), and development. Therefore, 
reality is movement; life is flow (liu zhuan).9 
 
Having the power to take action in the present, to Li, therefore takes on a particular shape that 
is necessarily rather than coincidentally related to time.  In this passage, he reflects both 
Bergson’s notion of “duration,” which, like the Book of Changes, confronts time as “the 
unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge of novelty.”10 For Li as for Bergson, “in 
duration, considered as a creative evolution, there is perpetual creation of possibility and not 
only of reality.”11  Human beings are not constrained by time, as agents are constrained by 
structures; but nor are they masters of time. Rather, they are part of the life that constitutes 
time, and vice-versa. In the Changes and its commentaries, the specific content of our actions, 
and the exercise of our power, appears similarly within the infinite and ceaseless condition of 
“backing and forthing” emblematized in the four seasons.12  Li follows Jin Shengtan, the late 
Ming-early Qing literary commentator, to understand the Changes’ concepts of zhou and yi as 
“constancy” (chang wang) and “transformation” (bian yi) in a ceaseless process of renewal 
(ri ri xin).
13
  For Li, embracing this succession of time involves creating breadth, continuity, 
progressive transformation, and development, which shifts the emphasis to innovation 
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 Li, “Jin,” 534. 
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 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 7; For discussion of Bergson’s influence on Li, see Meisner, Li Ta-Chao, 21–8, 
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through time rather than the cycling or repetition of past practices.  Our capacities to act 
should therefore focus on jiving with temporal rhythms we can sense but cannot control, 
which we can embody but not always definitively direct.   
This claim is not only descriptive, but normative. In his 1919 essay “Material 
Changes and Changes in Morality,” often heralded as his first exploration of Marxist 
historical materialism, Li explicitly frames moral dilemmas about right and wrong not in 
ethical or even cultural terms, but in temporal ones.14  Solving them means aligning them 
along axes of old/new and change/permanence, rather than mapping them onto contemporary 
divisions between China and the West which divorce Chinese history from global modes of 
time. Li claims his essay is motivated by recent complaints, in wake of both the revolution of 
1911 and the May Fourth movement (ca.1919-1927, which called for a more thoroughgoing 
embrace of “Western” values of scientific inquiry and democracy) that the old ways are gone 
but the new ones have not yet been established. This period of historical uncertainty poses a 
unique dilemma, because it fails to give clear signals about what, if anything, are the most 
appropriate ethical ways of acting at this time.  Many people, Li says, seem to think that 
morality is something that can and should be out of sync with its times: although materially 
we should always aim for the new, morality should always be rooted in the old. Material 
conditions may change, these people say, but morality should stay the same; it is more 
important to focus on the old in this case than to chase after the new.15   
In this essay Li uses Darwin to locate the theoretical foundations of morality in our 
social contexts,16  but looks to Marx to explain how and why morality differs over time and 
place.17  These theories show, Li argues, that morality follows changes in social conditions, 
                                                          
14
 Dazhao Li, “Wuzhi Biandong Yu Daode Biandong (Material Changes and Morality Changes),” Xin Chao 2, 
no. 2 (December 1, 1919): Reprinted in Li Dazhao Wenji, vol. 2, 134–152. 
15
 Ibid., 135. 
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 Ibid., 136–8. 
17
 Ibid., 139. 
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so that if society regresses so too will its moral codes. But even this kind of turning-back is 
not really best understood as a revival of the old, but rather the resurgence of the new: 
  
…the great path of social transformation (jin hua) is a continuously cumulative great 
flow; there is only going forward, there is never looking back; there is only opening to 
the new, never reviving the old; during those times that the old is destroyed, the new 
rises up again. This is a rebirth, a re-creation; you cannot in any way say this is a 
revival of the old.  Material conditions, morality—neither has any logic of ‘reviving 
the old’!”18 
 
Being moral, for Li, amounts to being timely, in both senses: timeliness entails action that 
deals forthrightly with the ontological reality of time’s flow, as well as actions that fit one’s 
era. To Li, the revolutionary promise which gripped his contemporaries since the 1911 
Revolution should not be grounded on a rupture from the past, but on continuity with it.19  He 
therefore distanced himself from calls by radical iconoclasts, such as his friend and sometime 
editor Chen Duxiu, to obliterate all forms of traditional thought in China. At the same time, 
conservative attempts to preserve the present—or revive the past—contradict the ceaseless 
“flow” of life surging ever onward. Joseph Levenson would echo similar sentiments half a 
century later, when he argued that traditionalism is necessarily “a completely hypothetical, 
self-destructive concept; a sense of the past can never develop if an original unmitigated 
reverence for ‘what is’ precludes its ever becoming past.”20  As Li explains elsewhere, “Even 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 151–2. 
19
 I therefore differ from Duranti’s interpretation of Li’s historiography as affirming “paradigmatic breaks” in 
history; see Michela Duranti, “Li Dazhao’s Historical Vision in Shixue Yao Lun” (presented at the Across and 
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Chao Center for Asian Studies, Rice University, 2010), 8–9. 
20
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if we concede that the road of historical is cyclical, this cycle also tracks forward movement, 
it is not a kind of turning back.”21  
Under these conditions, our activities may be understood as what, in a 1923 essay that 
exhibits marked continuity with these early ruminations, Li calls the “extension” (yin) of the 
line of time, a power which exists only in this present moment, where “the limitless future 
gestates”: 
 
They say time is like a line, extending out ever longer, and once extended it orders all 
the points between the past and now. But to use this metaphor to explain the 
succession of time isn’t really reasonable. Because this line, once extended, belongs 
entirely to the past; and before it is extended, exists in the future; but where is the 
point of now situated?22 
 
This passage indicates Li’s commitment to a truly continuous flow of time; the present is not 
conceived as a point from which the past and future emanate, so much as a moment in which 
human action contributes and directs to the movement of time forward. Agency thus 
“emerges in the process of becoming, not in the mysterious movements between” states of 
being.23 Li goes on to explain, 
 
The movement of this line in reality must have a force (li) behind it, before the 
extension can be manifest, as it goes from the past, and heads toward the future.  The 
movement of this force is precisely the action (xingwei) of this extension; and the 
action of this extension lies precisely in the moment of now…. If a moment has no 
                                                          
21
 Dazhao Li, “Shi (Time),” Chenbao Fifth Anniversary Supplement (December 1, 1923): 669. 
22
 Ibid., 666. 
23
 Stephanie Clare, “Agency, Signification, and Temporality,” Hypatia 24, no. 4 (October 2009): 59. 
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action, and makes no movement, then the now of this moment returns to non-
existence; the life of this moment is nothing more than a loss.24 
 
These passages help to situate Li vis-à-vis the Marxist historical materialism with which he is 
often associated, even as the inevitability of time’s flow—marked, it seems, by ongoing 
transformations of material and economic conditions—grounds a peculiar and distinctly non-
Marxist claim about human agency.  In essays such as “My Views on Marxism” and 
“Material Changes and Changes in Morality,” Li claims outright that thought, “isms,” 
philosophy, religion, morality, and law are unable to restrain material and economic 
changes.
25
 The arrow of this relationship only goes one way: economics and material 
conditions can wreak changes in ideational structures.26 However, Li points out the 
contradiction between Marx’s belief that productive forces are the motive power of history, 
versus claiming that all history is that of class struggle.27  Li interprets Marx’s mandate for a 
future socialism as calling for the promotion of ethical correction and the cultivation of 
humanist (rendao) movements in the present, in order to eliminate the bad habits and evil 
natures that humans have received from past history. You cannot wait for materialist changes, 
Li insists, and this is a point where Marxist theory needs to be corrected. Instead, 
 
We advocate using humanism to create a humanist spirit (renlei jingshen), and at the 
same time to use socialism to change economic organization. Without changing 
economic organization, and to seek only to change a humanist spirit, would be 
                                                          
24
 Li, “Shi (Time),” 666. 
25
 Dazhao Li, “Wo de Makesi Zhuyi Guan (My Views on Marxism),” Xin Qingnian 6, no. 5–6 (November 
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essay; see Shu-chin Wu, “Li Dazhao and the Rise of Modern Chinese Radicalism” (PhD dissertation, The 
University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2005); Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist 
Historiography in China, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 27. 
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ineffective. But not to change economic organization, and to seek only to change the 
humanist spirit, would also unfortunately be unsuccessful. We advocate simultaneous 
changes to both the material and spiritual, heart and matter at the same time.28 
 
Li concludes on the basis of this relationship between material forces and reality that we must 
craft a morality that suits our new situation, “a morality of people, beauty, practicality, great 
commonality (da tong), mutual aid, and creativity!” to satisfy the demands of a materially 
interconnected age.29  The earlier Chinese reform ideal of da tong, reached through a long 
process of humanist cultivation in both self and society, here reworks historical materialism 
to produce a dialectical and mutually dependent process of social transformation.  Like many 
of his intellectual colleagues—including Liang Qichao and Zhang Shizhao—Li theorizes a 
reform strategy which tacks between the internal human effort often associated with moral 
renovation, on the one hand, and changes in the external, material world associated with 
political and economic institutions, on the other.30  His activism embodies this dual 
commitment by resisting a unilateral strategy which turns solely on social revolution or a 
long wait for transformation in the means of production.31 In contrast to Marxist 
historiography, which tends to read time as a series of strategic points, Li emphasizes instead 
the potential of the present moment, each “now” promising a fugitive moment for action that 
alone can engender the future.
32
 
These considerations help us understand how Li’s idea of “extension,” mentioned 
above, comprises a unique and dynamic theory of agency.  To borrow phrasing from Diana 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., 68. This synthesis maps on also to his earlier call for a blending of “Eastern” and “Western” 
civilizations, in which Western materialism and activism is tempered by the spirituality and humanism of the 
East: Dazhao Li, “Dong Xi Wenming Genben de Yi Dian (The Fundamental Differences Between Eastern and 
Western Civilizations),” Yan Zhi 3 (July 1918): 60. 
29
 Li, “Wuzhi Biandong,” 152. 
30
 See Leigh Jenco, “‘Rule by Man’ and ‘Rule by Law’ in Early Republican China: Contributions to a 
Theoretical Debate,” The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 1 (February 2010): 181–203 for more discussion of 
this tendency in early Republican thought.  
31
 Meisner, Li Ta-Chao, 49. 
32
 Ibid., 169. 
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Coole, Li recognizes that human power to transform shared environments is a capacity 
immanent to the socio-temporal field which remains constantly in the process of becoming.33  
Li’s point in his early essays, as well as in “My Views on Marxism,” is not to render time a 
deterministic force which acts against human actions to change their circumstances. Rather, 
he inscribes time as one force that concatenates with others (economic, material, etc.) to 
make human agency possible. As Li’s own theory of history argues, however, this agency 
acts not only upon the present and future, but also upon the past.  In what follows, I show that 
by bringing together otherwise dispersed lineages of thought and action, such as neo-
Confucian and materialist modes of social reform, Li necessarily redraws the lines through 
which present thought and future innovation might be made intelligible and legitimate. 
 
Time and Agency in History 
These ideas are given richer and more sustained elaboration in Li’s masterwork of 
historiography, Essentials of Historical Study.  It is in this work that Li’s theory of agency 
grounds a theory of history, to explain how thought such as his own can be seen as properly 
global rather than merely syncretic.  Essentials struggles with the realization that present 
actions transform not only future outcomes, but also the way in which we view the past—the 
ongoing transformations Li associates with human agency, in other words, repeatedly and 
paradoxically change history, rather than are marked by it. On this basis, Li’s drawing 
together of neo-Confucian, Darwinian, materialist and other commitments can be redescribed 
as an intervention in history: they change not only the nature of thought in the present, but 
also the way in which that thought might be situated in time, as belonging to the past of 
particular communities or individuals rather than others.  In my discussion above, my 
recourse to a variety of alternative descriptions that both pre- and post-date Li (e.g., to Grosz 
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as well as Jin) gestures toward the kind of diverse, global sources necessary to render Li’s 
thought legible. In this and the following section, I elaborate on Li’s theory of history to show 
how it explains these sources in terms of lineages which inform, even as they are created by, 
interventions in the present.  We are then in a better position to understand his thought as 
“global,” in that it inaugurates—even as it must be understood in terms of—not one but 
multiple trajectories, which arise from diverse regions of the world to inform conversations 
that are no longer local in either scope or character.          
Essentials portrays history as an evolving (rather than unfurling) narrative about 
human life activity.34  “What is living history, true history?” Li asks.  “Speaking simply, 
history is human life and the culture it produces”—an inexhaustible totality, whose “facts” 
(shi shi) are vivid, alive, and ceaselessly changing:35 
 
So-called historical facts are facts in the process of being interpreted. Interpretations 
are alive, and contain progressiveness. Therefore historical facts are also alive, and 
contain progressiveness. Simply having a complete set of materials does not qualify 
as a historical reality; you must have a complete interpretation before [something] can 
be considered a historical reality. And a historical reality is something temporary, 
which is determined by the times and changes with the times; it is not fast-and-hard.  
Historical realities are of two kinds: one that says that materials about an event that 
has occurred are correct; and the other that says an interpretation about an event that 
has occurred are correct. The first changes relatively rarely; the latter changes with the 
times.  Interpretations are knowledge with respect to facts, and knowledge increases 
and expands every day, so therefore interpretations change every day.  There is also a 
                                                          
34
 My choice of terms here invokes Bergson’s distinction between “evolution”--the eruption of the radically 
new--and “unfurling”--the re-arrangement of the pre-existing. See Bergson, The Creative Mind, 10. 
35
 Li, Shi Xue Yao Lun, 714–5, 717 On the basis of the holistic nature of the life activity history documents, Li 
calls for the formation of a new field of inquiry called “humanistic study” (ren wen xue) (734). 
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real past, and a historical past: the real past is over, dead, gone; the past event is done, 
finished; past persons are gone in an instant, and can never come back; expecting any 
change from them is forever impossible. That which can be expanded and enlarged is 
not the past itself, but our knowledge about the past.36 
  
Li’s insistence that the facts of history change constantly reflects his view that facts are 
themselves the product of new histories, which are constantly being created and as such 
remain beyond definitive anticipation. As the present changes, so too does the past, a 
transformation  Li associates with positive progress toward truth.37  Although he insists that 
the growth of a “science” of history requires the search and discovery of certain “general 
principles” (li fa) by the historian, “the reality of history is always in development, in 
progress; there is no history that is complete.” This means that conclusions reached are 
always tentative, such that “recorded history must also be ceaselessly modified.”38  
Here Li departs markedly from Liang Qichao’s views on historiography, put forward 
around the turn of the century, which according to Tang Xiaobing identified history with 
“reorganizing the past as a rational, collective experience around a reinvented agency” of the 
nation-state.39  Li’s point is rather to emphasize the emergent, uncertain character of social 
development—seeing it as an open-ended evolution whose jagged unfolding is made possible 
through human agency, rather than a teleological movement toward a fixed goal that societies 
perpetually lag behind. Wu Shu-chin has ascribed Li’s resistance to Darwinian notions of 
social progress to his awareness of China’s place within a larger world.  As victims of 
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imperialism in a progressive universe, the Chinese would be helpless to overcome their 
oppression.
40
  In contrast, by emphasizing the role of human agency and the cosmically 
unfolding rather than progressive nature of time, Li enables the participation of all people in 
fostering a global tide of change toward a more peaceful future.
41
 
 This global participation turns crucially on the agency promised by Li’s theory of 
history.  Just as unreflective human actions create history, so too (and to a greater degree) do 
reflective attempts to study it. In fact, Li inscribes historical research as an important form of 
action with the power to transform society positively.  He compares the examination of past 
segments of history to the climbing of a tall building, which holds layers and layers of 
accumulated human experience. “Only by ascending to the very top, can the horizons of 
limitless futures and the inexhaustible visions of human life be seen with a bit greater 
clarity.”42  Becoming in tune with events as they occur, we develop a self-awareness that 
 
leads us to discover within history our own world, our own selves, making us aware 
of our own power (quan wei), knowing that past history is precisely what everyone 
(ren ren) has created, and that the history that spans from now to the future is also of 
this nature.43 
Li’s vision of agency recognizes that history changes every day alongside the future. To think 
that the ancient past is somehow ahead of us, and the yet-to-come is somehow behind us, Li 
argues, is to contradict the reality of the development of great nature and great reality; the 
start of our history “lies not in the ancients, but in the present; it hastens not toward the broad 
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and limitless past, but toward the broad and limitless future.”44 This “living history” fosters 
an alternative, future-oriented and open-ended trajectory which is always changing, based on 
syntheses and connections made in the present.45  
As this discussion of Li’s thought reveals, his work is always-already global: not only 
does it source ideas from a variety of geographical areas, but he also thinks carefully about 
how thought must change to reflect our participation in a flow of time now seen to be shared 
by everyone around the world, rather than centered within a particular society or nation.  In 
what follows, I illustrate how his thought is also global in a third, more complex sense, 
suggested by Li’s own theory of agency: its syncretism does not simply concatenate discrete 
ideas, but brings into view continuities which connect particular, sometimes geographically 
specific lineages of thought to the global theory of the future.  I suggest two such lineages 
here, which Li’s work both calls into being and extends in new ways.  One links Li’s work to 
contemporary and ongoing intellectual responses within the Chinese political context; the 
other to scholarship in political and social theory which emphasizes the vitalist role of time in 
the exercise of agency.  These comparisons are not intended to exhaust the content of Li’s 
thought; rather, they demonstrate the extent to which his appropriation of ideas from places 
such as Europe and Japan is an act of agency—an event which transforms not only Li’s own 
present and future contexts, but also enacts a global thought which is more than just a 
localized form of Western knowledge. As I will show, this perspective resolves certain 
interpretive problems specific to Li himself, but more importantly demonstrates new ways in 
which global thought might come to be defined by plural lineages, whose continuities in his 
case stretch into the history and future of Asia as well as of Europe.     
 
Li’s Multiple Trajectories 
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Like his contemporaries, Li sought a means by which human agents could hasten 
forward the very history that seemed to be holding them back—whether that history turns on 
a narrative of industrial development and modernization, Darwinian natural selection, 
Marxist stages that culminate in thorough social revolution, or a combination of these.  The 
problem itself exhibits marked continuity with late Qing (circa 1890s) conceptualizations of 
historical progress and human action, in which “the ultimate source of being is no longer 
viewed as a refuge but as the source of a kind of infinite propulsive energy breaking through 
all the confining structures of human history and finally leading men to an ultimate 
deliverance on both the societal and individual levels.”46  These visions of action and progress 
expressed a neo-Confucian ethic, drawn from the earlier classical text The Great Learning, 
which urged readers to “cultivate oneself, order the family, govern the state, and bring peace 
to all-under-Heaven.”47  In most interpretations of this ethic, which formed a central part of 
Confucian orthodoxy since the fourteenth century, efficacious political activity was seen as 
constitutive, rather than a precondition for, the proper channeling of this energy from one’s 
self to one’s society and beyond. At the same time, such channeling both presupposed and 
fashioned a particular kind of subjectivity.   
Until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, that subjectivity was construed as a ritually 
disciplined scholar-official. Under the republic, it was replaced by an image of a self-aware, 
national citizen oriented in the right way to the right kinds of worldly circumstances (in Li’s 
case, the ontological conditions of time). These visions often produced a well-noted tension 
between the ongoing rectification of consciousness by late imperial literati as well as 
republican citizens, on the one hand, and their repeated inability to produce the outer world 
they meant to secure, on the other—in the process engendering an anxiety-inducing failure to 
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“escape from predicament.”48  By the early Republic, even visions of explicitly democratic 
agency continued to be wracked by such tensions, framed as they were in terms of typically 
literati activities such as participating in local self-government, partaking in some kind of 
moral self-cultivation, and engendering elite concern for the masses.  Political thinkers such 
as Liang Qichao as well as Li’s colleague Zhang Shizhao characterized democratic political 
action as a process that, at least in part, consisted of ruling oneself before one could 
effectively joining others in ruling.49   
Zhang’s formulation of such agency bears an instructive similarity to Li Dazhao’s 
approach here. In a series of essays (many written for the Tiger Magazine, a leading opinion 
journal Zhang edited and for which Li Dazhao was a frequent contributor), Zhang called for a 
new vision of “self-awareness” appropriate to self-ruling citizens.  Zhang identifies self-
awareness as the realization by the people that “the power to rise up in anger to chasten and 
admonish [their rulers] abides in their own selves.”50  For Zhang as for Li, and indeed as for 
many neo-Confucians before them, we gain traction on a dynamic external environment 
through the rectification of our consciousness, through viewing things the right way. In an 
early essay addressed to his youthful colleagues in the New Culture movement, many of 
whom would go on to participate in the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 to urge a 
remaking of China’s social culture, Li offers a vivid picture of what such agency might entail: 
 
We who are young and hot-blooded, standing in this great, whirling current should 
have fortitude and independent will to stand firm, resisting the current’s force, 
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remaining consistent in a changing world. Then we can identify ourselves with the 
universe, our springtime with the springtime of the universe…. 
 
Let us who are young stand firm as a rock in mid-stream and, taking now as the 
middle point [in history]; let us consign all old histories to the flames, develop our 
national virtues, and write a glorious opening page in modern history.51   
 
Although a somewhat hyperbolic expression of what he would at a more mature stage 
elaborate in less evocative and more academic terms, Li’s call to youth to preserve eternal 
spring suggests that we come to terms with our environment, and inaugurate reform, through 
transformations in our own understanding of where and how we are situated cosmologically.  
For Li in 1916, China as the “central kingdom” must be recognized as central not only in 
space but also in time: according to Fabio Lanza, Li’s “Spring” places China’s young people 
“in the middle of a global and coeval political time,” in which “a specific historical 
situation—that of expanding capitalism, colonialism, and national revolution” is refigured as 
“the shared possibility of a future that would be potentially universal.”52 
Zhang’s approach is structurally similar but its focus is different; he attends to the 
relationship between our personal selves and other, differently situated selves as we come to 
recognize our shared capacities for world-changing activity. Zhang urges us to recognize that 
“external things and the self are mutually corresponding, such that it would be totally 
ridiculous to speak only of things and not of the self, to speak only of the self and not of 
things. Therefore, if there are no ‘selves,’ there can be no country.”53  In this way, the process 
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of gaining self-awareness constitutes, and not merely supplements or grounds, the actions of 
a properly democratic actor, even as it is self-awareness that makes democracy possible.54 
An important contrast between Li and Zhang, then, lies in their characterization of 
what it is we are gaining consciousness of, and how exactly our consciousness comes to make 
a difference for our external, shared environment. How is it that we come to have the power 
to do what we hope to accomplish?  A central point for Li is that political actors who seek the 
power to change society must recognize that the context in which they act extends 
unpredictably and irreducibly to both the past and future, which are increasingly interpreted 
as coeval with globally and cosmically shared time. This orientation is better exemplified by 
the universalist utopian vision of Tan Sitong in his 1898 reformist tract Ren xue (Study of 
Benevolence), which like Li emphasized the future as a time of political and moral 
deliverance, mediated by human beings who take account of the materialist forces of time 
acting with and through them.55  In fact, in his 1923 essay “Time,” Li criticizes Zhang and 
Liang explicitly for assuming an unreflectively cyclical, and paradoxically regressive, view 
of time that both elides the inevitable progression of time and disables the transformative 
possibilities of the future.56   
On this point Li’s ideas dovetail with an emerging literature on political agency that 
situates human power within a range of non-human material conditions. In the words of 
theorist Elizabeth Grosz, for this “new materialist” approach, matter or nature “is construed 
as a force, provocation, activity, or incitement, rather than, as is the current fashion in 
feminist and cultural studies, where nature is considered an inert passivity onto which life, 
culture, and the human impose themselves.”57 Like Li, these new materialists draw on 
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Charles Darwin and Henri Bergson to clarify the consequences for political life of taking 
seriously what Bennett calls “the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies,” when matter and things 
have the capacity not only to block human designs but also to be “actants”—forces with 
trajectories, propensities, and tendencies of their own.58  The theories of agency formulated 
by this “new materialist” literature emphasize, in light of research on entropy, complexity, 
and cognition, the emergent rather than “given” character of that agency.  New materialists 
emphasize the ways in which the quantity, character, and scope of agency takes shape 
through its embeddedness in broad, contingent material constellations. And, much like Li’s 
call to youth to hold firm as rocks in a stream, they recognize that efficacious action requires 
particular kinds of attitudes: events such as the “modern history” Li evokes inaugurate new 
configurations of possibilities, but they can “‘happen’ to us only if we are in the right 
disposition.”59  
On this reading, agency does not simply equate to a prefigured and transparent causal 
input to particular social contexts; it is not brought to the political or social arena so much as 
recognized as one capacity spontaneously and unevenly created within those arenas.  In Li’s 
case, the constituent force that makes possible human agency is time. The ongoing flow of 
time grounds Li’s understanding of agency as having a material as well as abstract character.  
“Our life is an eternity within time, an eternity expressed in the present moment, not in the 
past or the future…the sole thing really within our grasp is now.”60 The capacities that enable 
this action in the present is not a property of the human body, but of a situation in which that 
body finds itself61—located as it is in between past and future.    
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These two comparisons—between the formulations of agency by his historical 
contemporaries, on one hand, and a series of current debates about the role played by 
materialist forces in human efficacy, on the other—help to situate Li’s contribution across 
time as well as space. But to understand the significance of his work solely in terms of these 
two approaches would fail to heed Li’s own theory about the way action in the present 
inevitably remakes the past, rather than assumes it; in the process, it would reproduce those 
problematic frameworks in which global thought remains understood in terms of existing 
approaches and concerns.  To follow Li, we should use the agentic capacities of the present to 
rework the very historical grounding of future action and thought.  Rather than see his work 
as a derivation of what others have done or are doing, we must also inscribe Li’s 
particularities as redirections or potentially disruptive formulations of the problem he shares 
with these two approaches.   
We might begin by noting an important contrast between Li and current political 
theories of agency, namely the former’s lack of attention to freedom as a motivation or goal.  
This is significant because of the historically tight associations in much western political 
theory between power, and thus the capacity to act identified with agency, and freedom. 
Often agency involves (or requires) securing freedom to act, in which rights and 
responsibilities with respect to other actors are enacted typically by state-centered forms of 
control.62  Even those scholars working on strands of critical theory emerging from Foucault 
and Habermas, who seek more complex understandings of how power both creates its 
subjects as well as enables subjects to contest their conditions, define such power in terms of 
freedom.63  Similar preoccupations mark the more unconventional theorists of new 
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materialism surveyed here.  Sharon Krause, for example, embraces new materialist ideas 
precisely because their more nuanced visions of embodied selves “helps us to see why 
material inequalities have such a deep impact on freedom,” even as her critique of new 
materialism is based on a concern that “when agency is conceived as a function of bodies and 
material assemblages rather than individuated, reflective selves, attributions of personal 
responsibility become difficult to sustain.”64 Diana Coole’s reworked, materialist definition of 
agency also retains freedom as an “analytical index” of the operation of agency.65 
The fact that Li’s agency is not preoccupied with freedom (or its corollary, individual 
responsibility) suggests that it sources a different kind of power—one that is cosmologically 
informed rather than derived exclusively from human effort.66  His anti-imperialist turn after 
the end of World War I shows that he was not entirely uninterested in modern-day notions of 
collective democratic action or governmental power. But his calls to action, even after his 
definitive “conversion” to Marxism in 1920, bank almost exclusively on the formation of 
particular kinds of subjectivities that merge with ongoing cosmic (or ontological) movements, 
particularly time.  These observations suggest that, for Li, power is best characterized as an 
influence that emerges from situational leverage; it is not the application of force that 
attempts to control particular outcomes.  We must accept our placement in the flow of time, 
which exists outside of our total control, even as we must “think” our present as a singular 
moment in which to act.  
Human agency, therefore, is not something that accumulates or is quantifiable. It 
grows stronger, but not in the sense that some agent accumulates more guarantees of, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
doi:10.1177/0961463X11399174, who argues that the focus of recent accounts of temporality on freedom stem 
from an unjustified subjective experientialism. 
64
 Krause, “Bodies in Action,” 318, 300. 
65
 Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 125. 
66
 As has often been noted, Li repurposes Marxist materialism in a way deeply in tune with Confucian and 
Daoist ideals of cosmological vitalities, evocative of elements found within Daoist texts as well as the 
metaphysical divination text the Yijing (Book of Changes); see Meisner, Li Ta-Chao, 110; C. Pozzana, “Spring, 
Temporality, and History in Li Dazhao,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 3, no. 2 (1995): 289, 
doi:10.1215/10679847-3-2-283; Renqiu 朱人求 Zhu, “Li Dazhao de Dao Jia Wenhua Qingjie 李大钊的道家文
化情结,” Shehui Kexue Luntan 9 (2007): 31–36. 
24 
 
wider spaces for, her own free action.  Human agents become more powerful only in so far as 
they grow more capable of felicitously sensing such potentials for leverage, and imbuing 
others with confidence in that potency. For Li and many of his colleagues before the May 
Fourth movement, this process is facilitated in both parties not only by felicitous 
circumstances, but by imbibing more of the “right kind” of education and culture.67 By the 
mid-1920s, Li interpreted this concern in terms of peasant education: class struggle in the 
villages could be enacted through the help of those with higher levels of culture, such as 
urban intellectuals. This education, in turn, would release the spontaneous forces of peasantry 
and make them fully conscious of their role in history.68  According to Meisner, this strategy 
turned on Li’s faith in the abilities of intellectuals “to bring forth the powerful subjective 
forces latent in the present—the great storehouses of ‘surplus energy’ that Li argued had been 
accumulating in China over the centuries.”69 
Despite Meisner’s phrasing here, it seems this kind of power in fact turns more on 
leverage than on accumulation, on felicitous interventions more than shared consensus. In his 
central emphasis on the human element, and in retaining a clear boundary between humans 
and natural forces such as time, Li once again bears closer resemblance to his Chinese 
contemporaries and predecessors than to new materialists such as Bennett, who urge a further 
de-anthropomorphization of agency.70  As themselves conglomerates or centers of cosmic 
activity, human subjects retain an important ability to focus these forces in a way that 
complies with but also exceeds them.  He would agree in a limited way with Krause, who 
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argues that subjectivity—“the capacity to stand in reflexive relation to oneself”—is the very 
thing that distinguishes agency from mere cause.71  
Importantly, however, Li does not embrace Krause’s notion of personal responsibility 
and subjectivity.  To Li, things are only powerful when they are imbricated within human and 
cosmic/temporal relationships, but not in a way that either cumulates in collective action or 
turns on the interests of distinct, autonomous selves with predetermined political goals.  His 
individualism in this sense is meaningfully Chinese: he does “not stress an individual’s 
separation, total independence, and uniqueness from external authorities of power,” but rather 
emphasizes “one’s power from within the context of one’s connection and unity (or harmony) 
with external authorities of power.”72 The independent “ego” for Li is simply the “condition 
for recognizing the singularity of the times.”73 This particular form of subjectivity finds its 
extension (to use Li’s term) in the 1980s, as Chinese humanist Marxists revisited the problem 
of human agency in a world rent by both natural and political forms of power.  Emphasizing 
the voluntarist capacity of the properly ordered human subject to act powerfully on her 
environment, these humanist positions insist on the subject’s inevitable and dialectical 
placement within a materialist world she can contribute to but never succeed in totally 
controlling.74 Like current discussions on material agency, however, these Marxist positions 
suggest the direction of Li’s trajectory only in ways that continue, but do not determine, it.  
 
Li Dazhao and Global Thought 
The global aspects of Li’s thought have made his work notoriously difficult to situate 
in space or time. I have tried to show above that the connections between Li and such a 
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diverse set of thinkers—ranging from his Chinese contemporaries and predecessors, to Marx 
and Bergson, and on to a set of current theorists roughly categorized as new materialists—do 
not signal Li’s incoherence. Rather, I have argued on the basis of Li’s own theory of agency 
that these connections show how Li formulates a new global thought continuous with not one 
but a plurality of lineages. In what follows I want to consider the implications—for both Li’s 
ideas, as well as for the “global thought” I have used his ideas to elaborate—of this new 
method.  
Li’s involvement in founding the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 has led many 
commentators to interpret his earlier work as building up to the Marxist sympathies he 
expressed in the 1920s, and his later work as reflecting or developing these pre-existing 
ideological commitments.  In her article “What is Wrong with Li Dazhao?” Susanne 
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik explains the discomfort that Li caused for Marxist historiography, 
particularly before the centennial celebration of Li’s birth in 1989.75 The problem was that 
describing Li’s ideas accurately would make him appear earlier in time than he is supposed to: 
he would be a founder of Chinese communist ideology before the officially designated 
founding generation, led by Mao Zedong, claimed to take the stage of history.76 In a similar 
way, Li’s influential biographer Maurice Meisner refers repeatedly to the awkward 
“reappearance” of Li’s “pre-Marxian worldview” long after Li supposedly turned Marxist. It 
is as though his past worldview, largely comprised of “traditional” ideologies such as 
Confucianism, forgot it was supposed to stay past.  These binaries are reproduced even in 
more recent Chinese scholarship, where burgeoning attention to Li’s debts to traditional 
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These readings are representative of how thought produced outside of, or in resistance 
to, globally powerful streams of influence ruptures the temporal expectations which hold 
their established traditions in place. In sourcing ideas from places and times maligned as 
backward by Enlightenment narratives of progress, such thought often challenges temporal 
boundaries between “modern” and “traditional.”78 These troubles are deepened further by 
work which engages ideologies such as social Darwinism and Marxism, at least when those 
ideologies are defined in terms of commitment to sets of (timeless) principles, or when those 
principles impose teleological expectations about the development of human thought.79  
Global thought such as Li’s poses a problem, in other words, because it refuses to fix itself at 
a particular point in time. Its novel insights are difficult to render in terms of established 
commitments, because they exhibit no definitive relationship to any particular given past—
least of all to those pasts which typically orient Western theorists to what Kimberly 
Hutchings calls “the cosmopolitical present.”80   
Recent work in comparative political theory has suggested ways out of these binds, 
largely through mutual transformation through dialogic interaction. The hope is to interrogate 
Eurocentric characterizations of modernity which shore up boundaries between “our” 
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civilization and “their” tradition.81  These techniques address the future of global theorizing 
by suggesting the greater inclusion of historically marginalized voices to our ongoing 
conversations about political life. They do not, however, directly address the way temporal 
narratives themselves can be decentered, or past lineages implicated, in the service of this 
new future. To do so, Hutchings urges the cultivation of a “heterotemporal orientation” to 
question the fusion of the theorist’s present with “the” present of world politics.82  Li’s theory 
of agency, I contend, enables precisely such an orientation, by drawing attention to the ways 
in which global thought (such as his own) calls into being—rather than assumes the given 
existence of—particular yet heterogenous lineages of past thought, sourced from diverse sites 
of human experience, which go on to inform future modes of thinking and acting.    Li’s 
approach reveals that global thought does not exist in a series of parallel tracks, where 
thinkers always-already exist within some given genealogy and continue to produce thought 
in its name.  Nor does global thought imply some point of intersection between Chinese and 
Western thought, such that one instance of comparison is sufficient to capture its novelty. 
Rather, as Li himself would contend, the creation of global thought is transformative and its 
processes ongoing.  This view has important implications for the role of historically-
marginalized bodies of thought in the production of new knowledge.  
Typically, as I mentioned above, inclusion of such thought has taken the form of 
episodic moments of translation or dialogue.  In contrast, Li offers a new way by which such 
thought—in his case, the Confucianism that, by the end of the Qing dynasty, was already 
subject to contestation and cross-fertilization by other bodies of thought—does more than 
merely interrupt or chasten some given stream of “modern” (usually read “Western”) 
thinking and practice. Rather, such thought fundamentally changes where (and when) 
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thinking in the present and future might ground its arguments, and which historical materials 
(texts, ideas, events) it may draw upon as a legitimate resource.  By drawing on Li to 
formulate a compelling theory of agency in the present, and by showing how his work in the 
past expands ongoing research into time in the future, this essay has begun to demonstrate 
what theorizing of this nature might look like. Connecting Li to the trans-spatial and trans-
temporal concerns of thinkers who continue to draw inspiration from Li’s own interlocutors, 
such as Bergson, releases those concerns from prejudicial associations with particular cultural 
worldviews. At the same time, such connections also register the meaningful continuity of 
Li’s work with contemporary and ongoing discussions of political subjectivity in China.   
This is why the two trajectories I have offered here are not usefully described as an 
internal, particular, Chinese one in contrast to a Western, external, universal (or general) one.  
Following Li, we might see them as constructing two different pasts for thought whose 
application is necessarily global rather than local, dynamic rather than static.  In that sense, 
both trajectories self-consciously pose (rather than disingenuously claim to “discover”) a 
continuity for certain threads within the historically variegated heterogeneity of global 
thought. These trajectories form both the precedent and the horizon within which particular 
actors envision their moments of action (their “nows”), but also provide an orientation for 
how those actions and ideas may apply to other actors and societies in the future.  As Claudia 
Pozzana notes, Li is trying to “locate a theoretical division of time that can allow us to think 
of time in its singularity as well as in its relation to eternity.”83 
These continuities enable the production of knowledge in ways that build from, rather 
than truncate, indigenous or colonized thought.  This is particularly significant at a time when 
the very globalization of academic knowledge-production has resulted not in a proliferation 
of knowledge nourished by various local resources, but its standardization along lines of 
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European thought and practice.  As a result, past traditions once circulating outside of Euro-
America have largely been displaced, deepening their marginalization and deflating their 
capacity to inform present thought or practice.  As Dipesh Chakarbarty has observed with 
respect to the discipline of history,  “professional histories produced outside the West…tend 
to represent a break with past traditions of historiography rather than a point of continuity.”84  
By cultivating continuity where once there was rupture, Li’s theory of agency and my 
conceptualization of it as global thought resists rather than reinforces existing patterns of 
epistemological domination.  His intervention reveals each of the trajectories I outlined above 
as meaningfully fertilizing—that is, providing the terms, criteria, and resources for—a 
present and future global discussion on materially grounded human agency. Future 
innovations in this global conversation are disciplined by the very thought whose past they 
construct, but these lineages necessarily stretch into the past of China as well as Europe.  A 
truly global theory of agency, that is, must be situated in the stream of ideas flowing from 
many different sources, and recognize its progeny within the knowledge circulating in many 
different locales.  To the extent that global thought as I have described it in this essay does 
not simply reflect on, but itself embodies, the connectivities which characterize global 
communities, we might interpret such recognition as particular kind of responsibility: to 
cultivate attachment to not one but multiple lineages of thought, by asking questions about 
how and in what ways alternative pasts may chasten our existing modes of enquiry.   
These attachments, as Sheldon Pollock has pointed out in his influential examination 
of the early-modern Sanskrit cosmopolis, are distinct from the mere circulation of things, 
which “carry no hint of belonging.”85 Pollock speaks of the attachments created by literature, 
but we may extend this to include also the performance of global thought, whose own 
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creation or consumption of ideas “meant for large worlds or small places is a declaration of 
affiliation with that world or place.”86   Li’s intervention suggests that in this particular case 
neo-Confucian world-ordering may offer a disciplinary resource to inflect future work in new 
materialism, in the process “relocating” or “re-centering” its thinking.87  The cultivation of 
such attachments enables not only the provincialization of new materialism, in the sense that 
its adherents become more reflexive about the exclusions constituted by their own claims to 
knowledge, but also its globalization: such thought must regard neo-Confucianism as part of 
the imagined community to which it speaks, and the heritage from which it gains clarity 
about its own purpose.  It therefore becomes important to get these diverse pasts right, even 
as we recognize with Li the extent to which their present invocation alters their earlier 
trajectories and thus their meaning, which includes their present and future capacity to 
influence thought. These implications are given expression in the global influences, as well as 
the unprecedented and irreducible innovations, of Li Dazhao himself.  
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